"Living Off the Military-Industrial Complex": How Many Military Industry Rats Are There?

On December 27, 2023, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) announced the revocation of the CPPCC membership of three military industry experts: Wu Yansheng, Liu Shiquan, and Wang Changqing. (Screenshot from the internet)

People News Report — On the 24th of last month, Xinhua News Agency published an article titled "Prosecutor’s Office Lawfully Decides to Arrest He Wenzhong," stating that reporters on the 24th learned from the Supreme People's Procuratorate that the Hebei Provincial Procuratorate had decided to arrest He Wenzhong, former Party Committee member and Deputy General Manager of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC).

Previously, Xinhua and the CCDI website simultaneously reported on April 7 that He Wenzhong was "under investigation." Then, on the 11th of last month, they reported that He had been expelled from the Party and dismissed from public office for "serious violations of discipline and law."

Ordinarily, although CETC is massive in scale, it is only a deputy-ministerial-level central enterprise, with He holding only a bureau-level position. It is uncommon for a top-tier Party media outlet like Xinhua to follow every step in handling the fall of a bureau-level corrupt official. He Wenzhong attracted special attention because he was the first individual identified by the CCDI as "living off the military-industrial complex" following the large-scale corruption case within the Rocket Force and the Equipment Development Department.

In the CCDI’s announcement of He Wenzhong's "double dismissal" (expulsion from the Party and removal from office), they listed his primary charges as: "abusing power to illegally promote and appoint cadres; violating ethical boundaries through monetary and sexual exchanges; inflating personal desires, 'living off the military-industrial complex,' engaging in power-for-money exchanges, using his position to benefit others in business, and illegally accepting large sums of money."

Those familiar with the CCP's "anti-corruption" tactics may have noticed that the CCDI and several provincial disciplinary commissions often use the phrase "living off X" to summarize the main criminal activities of fallen officials within specific fields. Last year, The Paper published an article titled "Targeting 'Living Off X' Corruption for Precise Rectification," highlighting expressions like "living off finance" and "living off football" used in recent investigations of Liu Liange and Du Zhaocai. Netizens have paid close attention to this "news eye." In the CCDI’s announcement of the investigation into Liu Liange, former Party Secretary and Chairman of the Bank of China, they stated that he "abused his power, 'living off finance'...". In the investigation of Du Zhaocai, former Deputy Director of the General Administration of Sports, they said he "abused public resources, 'living off sports,' 'living off football,' seeking both official status and profit."

In addition to these two examples, so-called corruption cases showing "domain-specific characteristics" also include "living off education," "living off mining," "living off poverty alleviation," and so on. All these terms seem to stem from the Chinese proverb, "live off the mountain if near the mountain, live off the water if near the water." The most frequently used term on the CCDI’s website remains "living off finance." Just one day before He Wenzhong's double dismissal was announced, Fan Yifei, a former Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China and a typical "living off finance" figure, received a suspended death sentence.

I conducted a search on the CCDI’s website and found that, up to Fan Yifei, dozens of "financial tigers" had been charged with "living off finance." By extension, following He Wenzhong’s case, more "military-industrial tigers" are expected to be labeled as "living off the military-industrial complex" by the CCDI, including He’s former superiors, such as former CETC Chairman Chen Zhaoxiong and former General Manager Wu Manqing.

On the day following He's arrest announcement, Caixin published a report stating that Chen Zhaoxiong and Wu Manqing had been "taken away." However, a few hours later, under unknown pressure, the article was "404'd" (removed), along with related pages on Sina, Tencent, and other platforms. Fortunately, some overseas media that quickly republished the news, such as Ming Pao, still have the report online. Sing Tao Daily and Lianhe Zaobao used standard titles, while Ming Pao opted for a more sensational headline: "Collapse of Military Electronics Giant CETC — Deputy General Manager Arrested for Bribery; Caixin: Former Chairman and General Manager Both Under Investigation."

Among the 10 central military-industrial conglomerates directly serving "national defense," only CETC dares to claim it provides services to all PLA branches, including the Rocket Force, producing various high-tech military equipment. The group comprises over 700 entities, including 47 national research institutes and 17 listed companies, with more than 200,000 employees, 55% of whom are R&D personnel. CETC has been listed in the Fortune Global 500 for many years, making it one of the largest defense corporations globally.

This explains why news of He Wenzhong's investigation in April led almost all external media covering the story to link his downfall to the massive corruption cases within the Rocket Force and the Equipment Development Department.

Regardless of whether it’s CETC or other military-industrial groups, the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department serves as the “middleman” between these groups and the various branches and regional commands of the PLA, including the Rocket Force.

In previous articles from our Night Talks at Zhongnanhai column, we introduced Xiao Longxu, a "missile development, demonstration, and application engineering expert" and Chief Engineer of the Rocket Force Research Institute, as a model CCP member for the entire military. Meanwhile, He Wenzhong was recognized as a national model CCP member. Additionally, He Wenzhong was selected as an "Advanced Individual in the National Fight Against COVID-19," as he used his cutting-edge technological expertise to help Xi Jinping enforce lockdowns on 1.4 billion "COVID citizens."

Ten years ago, Xiao Longxu had already been touted by CCP state media as having “pioneered new control theories and techniques for ground-to-ground missile launches, achieving rapid random launches of missiles.” Related reports praised Xiao, saying that due to his work, China's strategic missiles have “reduced in size and become more compact,” while missile warhead power, reaction time, accuracy, and mobility have greatly improved, with a 100% launch success rate. Foreign media have even claimed that China's missiles possess "pinpoint strike capabilities" as a result.

During the period when Xiao Longxu was achieving these “world-class weapon advancements,” He Wenzhong held the position of Director of CETC’s 11th Research Institute.

This institute was established as the first research institute for electronic components and materials after the founding of the PRC, and its primary focus today is the development of solid-state lasers and infrared detector technology used in precision-guided weapons.

Therefore, it is very likely that Xiao Longxu, He Wenzhong, and He’s research institute collaborated on research and development efforts. After Xiao’s groundbreaking accomplishments that established the Rocket Force’s "world-leading" status, he was promoted to Chief Engineer of the Rocket Force Research Institute, while He Wenzhong served as Chief Engineer of CETC for several years before being appointed Deputy General Manager by the CCP Organization Department in May last year, succeeding Wu Manqing.

Wu Manqing, after completing both his undergraduate and graduate studies in electronic engineering at the National University of Defense Technology, chose to enter the military-industrial system without wearing a military uniform. In just 12 years, he rose to the rank of senior research engineer, and in 2012 he became Chief Engineer of CETC and Director of the Electronics Science Research Institute (General Research Institute). In 2017, he was promoted to Party Committee member and Deputy General Manager of CETC, while also serving as the Dean of the Network Security Academy at the University of Science and Technology of China and Director of the National Engineering Laboratory for Big Data Applications in Social Security Risk Perception and Control. He continued to hold the role of Chief Engineer at CETC for some time afterward.

Wu Manqing is described in CCP official materials as an expert in radar technology and network information systems, and as a founder and leader of China’s digital array radar theory and technical framework. It is said that he "independently innovated digital array technology, promoted continuous innovation in radar systems, successfully developed world-class radar for the KJ-500 early warning aircraft, and advanced significant breakthroughs in synthetic aperture radar technology and applications, driving innovations and operational applications in network information systems and related technologies."

Due to his "groundbreaking achievements in radar technology" for the PLA, Wu Manqing, despite not wearing a military uniform, was entrusted with a key military role as the head of the radar detection technology expert group within the PLA General Armament Department. In 2007, he was elected as a delegate to the 17th National Congress, and in 2009, at the age of 44, he was elected as an academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering. In 2012, he was made an alternate member of the 18th Central Committee.

After Xi Jinping took office following the 18th National Congress, Wu Manqing’s promotions were primarily due not to his "significant contributions" to advanced national defense research but to his application of network information research directly in the service of Xi's regime’s "stability maintenance" goals. Reportedly, due to his work as head of the National Engineering Laboratory for Big Data Applications in Social Security Risk Perception and Control, he was again favored by "the organization" and was promoted in August 2018 to General Manager and Deputy Party Secretary of CETC, with a vice-ministerial rank. At this point, he handed over his responsibilities as Chief Engineer, which he had held concurrently for many years, to He Wenzhong, who is currently awaiting sentencing.

It should be noted that Wu Manqing was elected Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Engineering in July 2022, after which he resigned as General Manager and Deputy Party Secretary of CETC. Following Caixin’s report of his being taken for investigation, his profile remains on the Chinese Academy of Engineering’s website, unlike Xiao Longxu, whose information was immediately removed after he was stripped of his National Committee membership in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

Although Caixin and various domestic media were forced to remove their reports, neither CCP officials nor particularly the Chinese Academy of Engineering has publicly refuted the news. Therefore, when Wu Manqing's name is no longer on the Chinese Academy of Engineering’s website, it will signify that “the other shoe has dropped.”

As for Chen Zhaoxiong, who served as He Wenzhong’s direct superior along with Wu Manqing at CETC, he has an even more complex background. Chen was one of the students of the 1978 university intake, completing both undergraduate and master’s degrees at the same institution, and worked in technical roles at the Chinese Academy of Sciences for years. In 1997, he began taking on administrative and Party responsibilities in the computer technology industry, and by 2005, he rose to become General Manager of China Electronics Corporation, one of the top ten military-industrial giants with vice-ministerial rank.

We know that in the CCP regime, there are numerous provincial-level leaders with backgrounds in science and technology, particularly in the military-industrial sector. Current members of the Politburo, such as Zhang Guoqing, Yuan Jiajun, and Ma Xingrui, are typical representatives of this group.

Among them, Yuan Jiajun transitioned from a military-industrial enterprise leader to a provincial Party committee member in March 2012. Chen Zhaoxiong, who is only one year older than Yuan, became a provincial Party committee member two years earlier. He was laterally transferred from his position as General Manager of a military-industrial enterprise to Vice Governor of Hunan Province, and two years later was promoted to Provincial Party Committee member, then to Deputy Secretary and Executive Vice Governor. He was only a step away from reaching a ministerial rank, but at this critical juncture, he was transferred back to Beijing by the CCP Organization Department to serve as a Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.

Those familiar with the system understand that being transferred from a position as Provincial Party Committee member and Executive Vice Governor to a deputy ministerial position in an ordinary ministry within the State Council essentially means that any prospects of being promoted to a full ministerial rank are virtually eliminated—unless one is pre-selected as the successor for the ministerial role.

Sure enough, Chen Zhaoxiong ended up serving as Deputy Minister of Industry and Information Technology for nearly five years, until, at the age of 59, he was assigned to CETC as Chairman and Party Secretary.

In other words, his appointment as head of CETC extended his retirement by three years, serving as a classic example of a political consolation. As for why Chen, who held the position of Provincial Party Committee member and Executive Vice Governor in Hunan, was suddenly removed from the pool of candidates for ministerial positions by the Organization Department, I do not know the specific reasons. However, when comparing his career path with that of former Hunan Party Secretary Xu Dazhe, one can conclude that Chen Zhaoxiong likely felt psychologically unbalanced and became resentful.

In October 2015, Chen Zhaoxiong was transferred back to Beijing to serve as Deputy Minister of Industry and Information Technology. Around the same time, Xu Dazhe, five years older and former Chairman of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, also held the position of Deputy Minister in the same ministry. However, after working together for just a year, Xu Dazhe was transferred to Hunan as Deputy Party Secretary, then became Governor, and later Party Secretary of the province, retiring at the age of 65. When comparing his career trajectory to that of Xu Dazhe, Chen Zhaoxiong likely felt immense resentment. There are many in the CCP’s officialdom who, having missed out on promotion opportunities, seek to “make a big haul” before retirement out of a sense of retribution against the system.

It is almost certain that when the CCDI announces disciplinary actions against Chen Zhaoxiong, he will be labeled as "living off the military-industrial complex," just like He Wenzhong. Others likely to be similarly labeled include former Chairman of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation Wu Yansheng, former Chairman of Norinco and former General Manager of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation Liu Shiquan, former Deputy General Manager of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation Wang Changqing (also former Deputy Director of the Third Research Institute responsible for missile development), former Director of the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology and Commander of the Long March 7 rocket Wang Xiaojun, as well as Long Fei, former Director of the General Office of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, Feng Jiehong, former Deputy Director of the Second Research Institute of the Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, Li Zhaozhi, former Director of the Equipment Support Department of Norinco, and Han Shuwang, former Party Secretary and Chairman of Aerospace Investment Holding Co., Ltd.

(Reprinted from Radio Free Asia)